Reinterrogation by Strauss, Marcy
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 22
Number 2 Winter 1995 Article 3
1-1-1995
Reinterrogation
Marcy Strauss
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 359 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol22/iss2/3
ARTICLES
Reinterrogation
By MARCY STRAuss*
Table of Contents
I. The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation.. 364
II. The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation:
A Consideration of the Underlying Values ............. 375
A. To Ensure a Voluntary Confession .................. 375
B. To Provide a Bright-Line Rule ...................... 376
C. Societal Interest in Crime Control .................. 378
D. Adherence to Precedent ............................ 384
III. Possible Breaking Points in the Edwards Rule: A
Consideration of the Values ............................ 386
A. The End of Custody ................................ 386
B. The End of the Offense ............................. 392
C. Time Elapsed Between the Invocation of Counsel
and the Second Approach .......................... 395
D. A Totality of Circumstances Approach ............. 398
IV. Conclusion .............................................. 404
In Miranda v. Arizona,1 the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced rules to assure that a criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination 2 is honored in the context of police in-
terrogation. The Supreme Court held that in order to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,3 a criminal suspect in
custody must be informed of certain constitutional rights before he is
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D. 1981, Georgetown University Law
Center; B.S. 1978, Northwestern University. I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky for read-
ing and critiquing this manuscript and to John Krings for his research assistance.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a general discussion of
the Fifth Amendment, see Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1086 (1994).
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
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subject to interrogation.4 Specifically, the police must warn the sus-
pect that he has the right to remain silent and the right to have an
attorney present during questioning.5 If the suspect exercises either
right, any interrogation must "cease."6 Moreover, any waiver of these
rights must be made knowingly and intelligently.7
Since Miranda, the Court has been struggling with the precise
reach of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Although
many aspects of the holding remain controversial,' one of the recur-
ring questions under Miranda is the issue of reinterrogation. What
restrictions, if any, exist on subsequent attempts by the police to re-
question a suspect once that person has invoked his right to remain
silent or his right to counsel?
Almost ten years after Miranda, the Court first visited that issue.
In Michigan v. Mosley,9 the Court re-examined the right to remain
silent and declared that the police may reinterrogate a suspect who
exercises this right, but only if the authorities "scrupulously honor"
that right.10 In Mosley, the Court determined that the police scrupu-
lously honored the suspect's right to remain silent despite the reinitia-
tion of police interrogation because the police immediately ceased the
initial interrogation, waited a sufficient period of time, and restricted
subsequent interrogations to different crimes than that involved in the
initial questioning." In other words, the Court in Mosley interpreted
Miranda to permit further questioning in certain circumstances fol-
lowing a suspect's request to remain silent. Thus, the Court in Mosley
4. There must be both custody and interrogation in order for Miranda to apply.
"Therefore, the police are not under an obligation to give warnings to a suspect whom they
take into custody but do not question or whom they question but do not take into cus-
tody." Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind- Formalism's Triumph
Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. Cium. L. R-v 243, 254 (1986) [hereinafter Grano,
Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind].
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
6. See infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. Some legal scholars have criticized the assumption that
suspects can ever waive their rights voluntarily given the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogation. See Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal
for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. Rnv. 69, 105 (1989).
8. The controversy surrounding Miranda in the last few decades is probably only sur-
passed by that engendered by Roe v. Wade. It has sparked significant political debate and
a tremendous flurry of academic articles. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the
Court, 79 MICH. L. Rnv. 865 (1981); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan, 31 VAND. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Stephen J. Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A
Historical Perspective, 24 AM. Cmmg. L. REv. 193 (1986).
9. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
10. Id. at 103.
11. Id. at 104.
said that a suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent does not
create a "blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary state-
ments or a permanent immunity from further interrogation."12
When a suspect invokes the right to counsel 3 rather than the
right to remain silent, however, the Court has imposed a per se prohi-
bition of police initiated interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona,'4 the
Supreme Court held that an accused who requests to deal with the
police only through counsel may not be subject to further interroga-
tion outside the presence of counsel unless the accused himself initi-
ates such conversation with the authorities.' 5 Thus, Edwards created
a bright-line rule: if a defendant asserts the right to counsel during
custodial interrogation, no police initiated interrogation may occur
outside the presence of counsel. There is no opportunity to consider
whether the police scrupulously honored the defendant's request.' 6
Yet this seemingly clear, bright-line rule has proven remarkably
blurry. For instance, one unresolved issue concerns the duration of
Edwards' protection: how long does the bar on police-initiated inter-
rogation last? Does the rule last in perpetuity-e., once a suspect
invokes the right to counsel, can the police ever reapproach him? If
not, what event or events should trigger the cessation of this protec-
tion? Since Miranda and Edwards are tied to custodial interrogation,
does a break in custody signal an end to the Edwards protection? If
so, what prevents the police from temporarily releasing and later rear-
resting a suspect in order to try to obtain a confession? Do Edwards
rights persist past the conviction and sentencing on the offense for
which the suspect initially invoked his right to counsel? What about
after the defendant pleads guilty but before sentencing? Additionally,
how does one factor in the simple passage of time? If a defendant
asserts his Edwards rights and this assertion is honored, may the po-
lice reapproach him weeks later to see if he has changed his mind?
Would the answer be different if the time between interrogations were
12. Id. at 102.
13. Unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which attaches automatically upon
the initiation of judicial proceedings, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977), the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel must be explicitly asserted. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a
Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.
259 (1993) (discussing the various tests for determining when counsel has been invoked
under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)). See also Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2350 (1994) (establishing that there must be a clear assertion of the right to counsel).
14. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
15. Id. at 484-85.
16. The Court in Edwards specifically distinguished its approach from that taken in
Mosley. Id. at 485. See also infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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months-or even years-after the initial assertion of the right to
counsel?
Any attempt to delineate the point at which once-asserted Ed-
wards rights should cease to exist raises fundamental questions about
the nature of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation. It
poses the same conflicting issues that the Court has been balancing
from Miranda to the present: the desire to protect an individual from
police badgering to ensure a "voluntary" confession versus society's
legitimate interest in fighting crime and the perceived importance con-
fessions play in that process. Obviously, a rule providing that a de-
fendant who requests the presence of counsel maintains that
protection throughout any future attempt by police to question him at
whatever time and for whatever crime prevents police badgering.
Such a policy, however, would almost certainly be viewed as having
too great a cost for society. Where do we strike the appropriate
balance?
The Supreme Court has yet to provide definitive answers to these
questions. It appeared that the Supreme Court might answer these
questions in United States v. Green:17 certiorari was granted on a
case-which was briefed and argued as well-posing the issue of
whether law enforcement personnel should be allowed to initiate in-
terrogation of a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel five
months previously in connection with an unrelated offense and where
the suspect had pled guilty to the unrelated offense prior to the inter-
rogation. 8 Unfortunately, the defendant in that case, Lowell Green,
died before a decision was rendered, and the Supreme Court dis-
missed the case.' 9
The questions posed can be answered by considering the possible
breaking points for Edwards rights, and measuring these possibilities
against the goals of Miranda and Edwards. One of the difficulties in
answering these questions, however, is the lack of consistency and pre-
cision on the part of the courts in deciding what the Edwards rule is
meant to accomplish, and in evaluating the proper role for confessions
17. 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 1835 (1993).
18. 592 A.2d 985, 988 (D.C. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992), vacated and
cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 1835 (1993).
19. Lowell Green was murdered about two blocks away from the Supreme Court
building on March 24, 1993. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup, N.Y. TIMES,
April 6, 1993, at A18. See generally Jeffrey E. Richardson, Note, It's Not Easy Being
Green: The Scope of the Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel 31 AM. CRiM. L. Rlv. 145
(1993).
in our system of justice. Case law is often contradictory and unclear
even while the Court is lauding the existence of "bright-line rules."
Section I of this Article describes the background of the right to
counsel during custodial interrogation by examining Miranda and the
cases attempting to more precisely define the nature of the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel set forth in Miranda. The
Court's decisions in Mosley, Edwards, and several other cases are con-
sidered in assessing how the Miranda rule has evolved. Finally, Sec-
tion I describes the facts of Green to illustrate how the question of
reinterrogation may arise.
Section II sets forth the goals of Miranda and Edwards as a way
of assessing the wisdom of any possible breaking point. These goals
include: ensuring voluntary, non-coerced confessions; maintaining the
bright-line nature of Miranda rights; enhancing the societal interest in
crime control; and fidelity to precedent.
Section III proposes and evaluates several possible "ending
points" for the assertion of the right to counsel in light of the goals
earlier delineated. The ending points considered are a break in cus-
tody; resolution of the offense for which the suspect invoked his right
to counsel; passage of time; and a totality-of-circumstances test. Con-
sidered individually, however, none of the suggested breaking points
justify ending Edwards' presumption that the defendant wishes to deal
with the authorities only through counsel. None of the breaking
points adequately protect the paramount interest expressed in Mi-
randa, and enforced through Edwards' prophylactic rule,2 0 of protect-
ing a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. A combination of two
"significant events"-a break in custody and a significant passage of
time-should suffice to permit the police to approach a defendant,
provide new Miranda warnings, and seek a possible waiver of rights.
If custody is narrowly defined, and the specific passage of time re-
quired between the initial invocation and any subsequent interroga-
tion is both delineated specifically, and sufficiently lengthy, the
suspect's rights will be adequately protected and the interests of law
enforcement will be served as well.
20. The Edwards rule is prophylactic because it can be violated by police conduct in
ways that do not actually compel the suspect to incriminate himself. In other words, the
rule may be violated even if the underlying interest on which the rule is based is not com-
promised. George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave's Bright Line Rule
Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. Rlv. 207, 230 (1993).
Winter 19951 REITRRO GATION
364 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:359
L The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation
Before Miranda, the law of confessions was governed largely by
the doctrine of voluntariness under the Due Process Clause.2 1 Con-
sidering the totality of circumstances, courts excluded evidence ob-
tained as a result of police coercion which rose to the level of a Due
Process violation.2 While this approach would condemn police prac-
tices of severe physical abuse zI it left largely uncontrolled a myriad of
other practices that did not reflect physical abuse but operated to co-
erce a suspect into making a statement. Police interrogation was still a
practice conducted totally under police control, with the suspect not
only isolated from external sources of support but also subjected to
police tactics to "persuade, trick or cajole" a confession.24
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court dramatically altered
the rules governing custodial interrogation. The Court, after survey-
ing the long history of physical abuse and psychological tactics
designed to trick and intimidate suspects into confession, concluded
that suspects could not meaningfully exercise their right against self-
incrimination in such circumstances. Thus, the Court held that the
Fifth Amendment required the police to inform suspects of their con-
stitutional rights and to obtain waivers of these rights before con-
ducting custodial interrogation.26
The now familiar Miranda warnings27 provide that the suspect
must be told that she has a right to remain silent and that anything she
says can be used against her. Moreover, the suspect must be informed
21. See generally, Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. Rev. 1417
(1985); Anne E. Link, Note, Fifth Amendment-the Constitutionality of Custodial Confes-
sions, 82 J. CPiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878 (1992).
22. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,541 (1961); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 5 VA. L. REv. 859, 864 (1979).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions which were made
only after the police whipped and nearly hung the defendants were excluded).
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
25. Id at 499. For a critical discussion of the Court's extrapolation of the rules from
the Fifth Amendment, see Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, supra note 4.
26. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440. There were four cases comprising this decision; the title
case arose from Ernesto Miranda's conviction for the kidnapping and rape of a woman.
Miranda's conviction was based on a confession made during custodial interrogation; dur-
ing that interrogation he made no request to speak to an attorney and was never advised
by police that he had a right to do so. The Court, by a five to four vote, overturned the
conviction because the police failed to comply with a set of rules governing interrogation
set forth in the decision. Only by following such regulations could the police negate the
inherently compulsive nature of custodial police interrogations.
27. Even my seven and nine-year-old sons can recite the warnings, virtually verbatim,
from memory.
that she has a right to have counsel present during the interrogation,
and that counsel will be appointed if she cannot afford it.28 The police
cannot interrogate a suspect unless she makes a voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent waiver of these rights. And, most importantly for pur-
poses of this article, if a suspect indicates at any time that she wishes
to remain silent, or that she wants an attorney present during interro-
gation, the questioning must cease immediately. Although the Court
did not address the topic of reinterrogation in any depth, Justice War-
ren, in dicta,29 described the procedures following an invocation of
rights as follows:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any state-
ment taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot bd
other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice
in producing a statement after the privilege has been once in-
yoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that
time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the
attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning.30
Despite the exhaustive, sixty page majority opinion, questions
soon arose concerning the scope of these newly established rights.
Miranda required that after a suspect invokes her rights, the questions
must cease; how stringently is this to be enforced? A decade after
announcing the Miranda rights, the Supreme Court began to address
this question-a quest that is still continuing. In Michigan v. Mosley,31
the Court considered whether police questioning of a suspect can re-
sume after the assertion of the right to remain silent. In Mosley, the
defendant was arrested for several robberies and given his Miranda
warnings. The questioning ceased after Mosley stated he did not want
to discuss the robberies. However, two hours later different detectives
28. This right to counsel derives from the Fifth Amendment; it is seen as a way to
implement the right against self-incrimination. See William H. Erickson, The Unfulfilled
Promise of Miranda v. Arizona, 24 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 291, 296 (1986). A lawyer's pres-
ence decreases the possibility of police coercion and ensures an accurate recording of the
statement and surrounding events. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
29. It is dicta because no rights were invoked in any of the cases.
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
31. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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approached Mosley, issued new Miranda warnings and, when he
agreed to talk, questioned him about a murder that was unrelated to
the robberies. Mosley then proceeded to make a number of inculpa-
tory statements. Mosley's incriminating statements were admitted at
trial, and he was convicted of murder. On appeal, Mosley argued that
because he initially had asserted his right to remain silent, the govern-
ment had violated his Fifth Amendment rights by reinterrogating him.
The Court disagreed. While recognizing the danger that repeated
rounds of questioning in the face of a decision to remain silent will
nearly always undermine a suspect's free will,32 it found that Mi-
randa's admonition that "interrogation must cease" upon assertion of
the right to silence cannot "sensibly be read to create a per se pro-
scription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any
police officer on any subject."33 Nothing in Miranda requires a blan-
ket prohibition of further interrogation, regardless of the
circumstances.
The Court stated that such a reading would "transform the Mi-
randa safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police
investigative activity."' Rather, the admissibility of statements elic-
ited from a suspect who exercised his right to remain silent depends
on "whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously
honored."'35 The Court concluded that Mosley had effectively
stopped the police interrogation about the robberies because the
questions immediately ceased after he had asserted his right to remain
silent. Morever, the police had scrupulously honored his decision to
cut off questioning despite the subsequent interrogation. The second
interrogation focused exclusively on a crime of a different nature and
occurred at a different time and place from the original interrogation.
Also, it involved different officers who again read him his Miranda
warnings, and it occurred a significant period of time after the first
invocation.36 In these circumstances, a defendant would not feel that
his original request to remain silent was being ignored.3
32. It. at 102. See also United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378 (1st Cir. 1992).
33. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102-03.
34. Id at 102.
35. Id. at 104.
36. Id. at 104-06. Here, a two hour time gap was considered significant. It& at 106.
37. Id. at 105. It is not clear from Mosley, nor from any subsequent Supreme Court
decision, which, if any, of these factors are necessary, and which are sufficient to find that a
suspect's rights were scrupulously honored despite a reinterrogation. For example, must
the questioning be about a different crime? A suspect, however, need not be told the topic
of interrogation prior to instituting a valid waiver. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
Thus, why does it matter if the subject happened to be a different crime if the suspect,
Wintr 1951 RIN~hROGAION367
Six years later, in Edwards v. Arizona,38 the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished between invoking the right to remain silent and invoking
the right to counsel with respect to reinterrogation. Although in Mos-
ley the Court explicitly rejected a ban on reinterrogation after a sus-
pect invokes the right to remain silent, in Edwards the Court
embraced such a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon fur-
ther questioning after the invocation of the right to counsel.
In Edwards the defendant was arrested for burglary, robbery, and
first degree murder. Edwards stated that he understood his rights and
was willing to speak with the authorities after he was read his Miranda
rights. After being told that another suspect had implicated him, Ed-
wards denied any involvement and gave a taped statement presenting
an alibi defense. He then stated that he wanted to "make a deal."
After the officer told him that he did not have the authority to make a
deal, Edwards then asserted his right to counsel by stating, "I want an
attorney before making a deal." At that point, all questioning ceased
and Edwards was taken to jail.39
The next morning two detectives came to the jail to see Edwards.
When told that the officers wanted to speak to him, Edwards replied
that he did not want to talk to anyone. After the guard told him that
he "had to" talk to them, Edwards met with the detectives. The of-
ficers informed him of his Miranda rights; Edwards said that he was
willing to talk, but that he wanted to hear the taped statement of the
accomplice who had implicated him. After listening to the tape, Ed-
wards said he would make a statement but that he did not want it
tape-recorded. Although the officers told him that any statement still
could be used against him even if not taped, Edwards still insisted that
when agreeing to the reinterrogation, did not know the subject at the time of the waiver?
In any event, the lower courts have disagreed about which of the Mosley elements are most
significant. In United States v. Hsu, the Court of Appeals noted:
Among the factors to which the Court looked in Mosley were the amount of time
that elapsed between interrogations, the provision of fresh warnings, the scope of
the second interrogation, and the zealousness of officers in pursuing questioning
after the suspect has asserted the right to silence. At no time, however .... did it
imply that a finding as to one of these enumerated factors-such as, for example,
a finding that only a short period of time had elapsed-would forestall the more
general inquiry into whether, in view of all relevant circumstances, the police
'scrupulously honored' the right to cut off questioning.
852 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). See also Grooms v. Keeney, 826 F.2d
883, 886 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the identity of the subject matter in both interroga-
tions was not enough in itself to render the second interrogation inadmissible); United
States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1278 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984) (most important factor is provision
of fresh set of warnings).
38. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
39. Id. at 479.
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it not be taped. He then proceeded to implicate himself in the
crime.4 °
Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his
Miranda rights had been violated when the officers questioned him
after he had invoked his right to counsel and no counsel had been
provided to him. The Supreme Court agreed that the use of his con-
fession at trial violated his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.41
Although the Court recognized the defendant's ability to validly waive
his Miranda rights and respond to interrogation, when the suspect re-
quests counsel,
when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation, and valid waiver of that right
cannot be established by showing only that he responded to fur-
ther police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights.... An accused such as Edwards, having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused him-
self initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police.42
Thus, in Edwards, the Court made clear that they were adopting
more stringent protections when a suspect invokes the right to counsel
than they did for the right to remain silent. Although a suspect's right
to silence had only to be "scrupulously honored," his right to counsel
would seemingly operate as an absolute bar to further police-initiated
interrogation in the absence of counsel. Under the rule in Edwards,
police-initiated reinterrogation is prohibited even when the suspect,
upon being requestioned, expressly waives his Miranda rights. Fresh
warnings and evidence of voluntariness in responding to questions do
not overcome the presumption that any subsequent waiver is invalid.
To reinforce the protections of Miranda, Edwards adopted a prophy-
lactic, seemingly bright-line rule: once a defendant asserts the right to
counsel, all questions must cease unless counsel is present or the de-
fendant himself initiates the conversation.43
Almost immediately, challenges were brought to clarify the
meaning of this restriction on subsequent interrogations under Ed-
wards. In virtually all post-Edwards cases, the Court has reaffirmed
40. Id
41. Id at 485-86.
42. Id at 484-85 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
43. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (plurality defines initiation
as further exchanges of communication or conversations by the accused evidencing a desire
for a generalized discussion relating to the investigation).
REINTERROGATION
the vitality of the bright-line rule prohibiting police-initiated interro-
gation after a suspect invokes the right to counsel.44 Most signficantly,
the Court rejected an attempt to make the Edwards rule offense-spe-
cific,45 and rejected an argument that reinterrogation can occur after
the suspect has had the opportunity to consult with an attorney fol-
lowing the initial invocation.46
Relying heavily on Michigan v. Mosley, many lower courts had
held that a defendant who asserts the right to counsel during interro-
gation can nonetheless be approached to waive his rights on a sepa-
rate, unrelated offense. The Supreme Court rejected this position in
Arizona v. Roberson,47 finding that the Edwards protection is not of-
fense-specific. 8 In Roberson, the suspect was read his Miranda rights
when he was arrested at the scene of a burglary. Roberson asserted
his right to counsel before answering any questions; the questioning
apparently ceased. Three days later, a different officer, who did not
know about the earlier request for counsel approached Roberson to
question him about a different burglary. The suspect was again in-
formed of his rights; this time, he waived his Miranda rights and made
an incriminating statement about this burglary. The trial court sup-
pressed the statement as violating the defendant's right under Mi-
randa and Edwards.49
The Supreme Court agreed that admission of the statement vio-
lated the defendant's Edwards rights even though the second interro-
gation concerned an unrelated offense. In so deciding, the Court
emphasized the desirability of maintaining the bright-line rule estab-
lished in Edwards. Moreover, the Court was concerned that permit-
ting reinterrogation, even on an unrelated offense, would wear down
the accused's will and badger him into waiving his rights. "[T]o a sus-
pect who has indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of cus-
todial interrogation by requesting counsel, any further interrogation
without counsel having been provided will surely exacerbate whatever
compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling."50
44. See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 297 n.195 (Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039
(1983), and its lenient interpretation of "initiation" represent an exception to the Court's
approach of maintaining or expanding the Edwards protections).
45. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
46. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
47. 486 U.S. at 678.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 686.
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Finally, the Court attempted to distinguish the invocation of the
right to remain silent and that of the right to counsel. According to
the Court, a suspect's decision to cut off questions does not imply that
he would be unwilling to speak on a different subject at a different
time.51 Invoking the right to counsel, on the other hand, evidences the
suspect's belief that he is incapable of proceeding vis-A-vis the authori-
ties without the countervailing weight of an attorney on his side.52 In
other words, the pressures of custodial interrogation which a suspect
wishes to avoid by interjecting an attorney between himself and the
police exist regardless of the subject of the questioning. Thus, in Rob-
erson, the Court refused to limit Edwards protections to the specific
topic of the initial invocation.
A few years later, the Court was faced with another possible limi-
tation on Edwards. In Minnick v. Mississippi,53 the Court was asked
to determine the meaning of the requirement that the suspect not be
subject to further interrogation until "counsel has been made avail-
able to him."54 Does this passage mean that once the suspect has the
opportunity to consult with counsel the police may reapproach and
attempt to obtain a valid waiver of rights? Or is the protection
broader than this; that once counsel is requested, all police-initiated
questions must cease unless counsel is present during any subsequent
interrogation?
The Supreme Court rejected the former approach and embraced
the latter in Minnick.55 Minnick was questioned in jail by two FBI
agents who read him his rights. Although Minnick refused to sign a
waiver form, he acknowledged that he understood his rights and said
he would not answer "very many questions." After discussing a few
issues, and being reminded that he did not have to answer any ques-
tions without a lawyer present, Minnick told the agents to come back
on Monday because he would have a lawyer by then and would make
a complete statement. After the FBI interview, appointed counsel
met with Minnick; apparently he spoke to his attorney two or three
times, either in person or by telephone. On Monday, the sheriff came
to the jail to question Minnick. Minnick testified that he was told that
he could not refuse to speak to the sheriff. After being advised again
51. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102.
52. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686.
53. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
54. Id at 147.
55. Id. at 153.
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of his rights, Minnick declined to sign a waiver form but proceeded to
make incriminating statements about the murder.
56
Prior to trial, Minnick moved to suppress the statements, arguing
that the statements were elicited in violation of his Edwards rights
because the police reinterrogated him without counsel being present
after his assertion of the right to counsel. The Mississippi Supreme
Court concluded that because counsel was made available to Minnick,
the Fifth Amendment was satisfied and the statements were
admissible.57
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.
In context, the requirement that counsel be 'made available' to
the accused refers to more than an opportunity to consult with
an attorney outside the interrogation room .... Whatever the
ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that
when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and offi-
cials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present,
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.58
Only this bright-line clarification of the Edwards rule, according to the
Court, could preserve the suspect's Fifth Amendment right: "A single
consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from per-
sistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights, or
from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may in-
crease as custody is prolonged."5 9 Moreover, the Court was con-
cerned that a contrary rule would lack clarity and thus undermine
Edwards' clear and unequivocal character.60 The definition of consul-
tation is far from certain; it encompasses a range of contact from a
telephone call to a hurried exchange in the hall to a lengthy in-person
conference. It would be difficult for the courts to discern which type
of consultation was sufficient to displace Edwards.
Thus, prior to the grant of certiorari in United States v. Green,61
the Supreme Court had declined two attempts to limit the reach of
Edwards. In Green, the Court was once again faced with a request to
depart from the bright-line rule of Edwards.
Green originally was arrested on July 18, 1989 on a charge of pos-
sessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute. He signed a
form indicating that he was unwilling to answer questions without
56. Id. at 148-49.
57. Id. at 159.
58. Id. at 152-53.
59. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153.
60. It at 154.
61. 592 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992), vacated and cert.
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 1835 (1993).
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having an attorney present; the defendant appeared in court the next
day and an attorney was appointed to represent him. In July, the drug
case was dismissed at the preliminary hearing; the defendant was then
remanded to the custody of juvenile authorities in connection with
another offense pending against him at the time. He was subsequently
indicted on the drug charge and arraigned in September, 1989. Green
remained in custody until he pled guilty to the lesser included offense
of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Following
the plea he was held in the Youth Center, Lorton Reformatory, while
a Youth Act Study was being conducted.62
Prior to sentencing on the drug offense, Detective Gossage ob-
tained an arrest warrant charging the defendant with the murder of
Cheaver Herriott in December, 1988. Green was brought to the po-
lice Homicide Office for booking.63 He was advised of his Miranda
rights, waived those rights, and discussed with Gossage his involve-
ment in the murder of Herriott. After being advised a second time of
his rights, he agreed to make a videotaped statement in which he ad-
mitted his involvement in the robbery and murder of Herriott. Six
weeks later, he was sentenced to fifteen months incarceration under
the Youth Act for the drug offense; several months after his sentenc-
ing he was indicted on various charges including first-degree murder.
Green moved to suppress his confession on the ground that, given
his initial refusal to answer questions without counsel at the time of
his arrest on the drug charges, the statement was obtained in violation
of his Edwards rights. The trial judge initially disagreed for three rea-
sons. First, the time between the invocation of the right and the sec-
ond interrogation was deemed significant; the court called the five
month interval "an extraordinary" time lapse. Second, the court
noted the absence of a coercive environment. Although the defend-
ant was under some restraint of liberty during the five months, during
the last part of the period he was not in jail but held at the Youth
Center. Finally, the defendant had the opportunity to consult repeat-
62. Id at 986.
63. As is often the case, the defendant's testimony paints a different picture concern-
ing the circumstances of his interrogation. Green claimed that he asked for his attorney at
the police station and only signed the form after the police told him: "You can make this
hard on yourself or make it easy. We got you for Kevin Henson too, you are a suspect in
that case. If you don't tell us something about Jamacian Tony, you are going to get charged
for both of these cases." The trial judge, as is usually the case, credited the detective's
version of the events and thus found that Green had been read his rights and waived them.
Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v. Green, 113 S. Ct. 1835 (1992) (No. 91-1521).
See generally, Richardson, supra note 19. See also Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 292 ("In
any swearing match between a police officer and a defendant, the defendant loses.")
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edly with counsel between his invocation of rights and the waiver of
rights that preceded his confession of murder.64
A few days after the trial court's ruling, however, Minnick v. Mis-
sissippi was decided, causing the trial judge to reconsider his order.
Noting that the most significant ground of his first ruling had been the
opportunity to consult with counsel and that in Minnick the Supreme
Court had specifically held that such an opportunity did not satisfy
Edwards, the judge ordered the confession suppressed.65
On appeal, the government essentially urged the Court of Ap-
peals to consider the unique factual context as distinguishing the in-
stant case from Edwards, Roberson and Minnick. The circumstances
of this case included the facts that the defendant had been furnished
counsel and had consulted with him, that the renewed questioning
concerned a crime entirely unrelated to the crime in which the defend-
ant invoked his right to counsel, that there was a five month time pe-
riod between questioning, and that the defendant had pled guilty to
the first crime. The government argued that these facts justified de-
parting from the Edwards rule because these factors, by themselves or
in combination, ensured against police badgering designed to coerce a
waiver of a previously asserted Miranda right.6 6
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's attempts to re-
place the bright-line approach of Edwards and its progeny with a case-
by-case determination.6 7 As to the ability to consult counsel and the
unrelated offense, the court noted that each fact was rejected in Min-
nick and Roberson, respectively, and that they "are not convinced that
in combination the [Supreme] Court would regard these two factors
differently."6 The appellate court had more sympathy for the argu-
ment that a five-month interval between interrogations should dispel
the Edwards presumption that the new waiver of rights is involun-
tary.69 Nonetheless, the court felt ill-equipped to delineate the precise
lapse of time sufficient to limit Edwards.
If five months in custody without evidence of police 'badgering'
is held sufficient to dispel Edwards' presumption ... then why
not three months or three weeks? At what point in time-and
in conjunction with what other circumstances-does it make
64. Green, 592 A.2d at 986.
65. Id at 986-87.
66. Brief for the United States at 9, United States v. Green, 113 S. Ct. 1835 (1992) (No.
91-1521).
67. Green, 592 A.2d at 991.
68. Id at 988.
69. I&
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doctrinal sense to treat the defendant's invocation of his right to
counsel as countermanded without any initiating activity on his
part? . .. [W]e think only the Supreme Court can explain
whether the Edwards' rule is time-tethered .... I
Thus, the court held that in the absence of Supreme Court guidance,
so long as the defendant remains in custody, the five months between
questioning cannot, singly or in combination with other factors, justify
a departure from Edwards.71
Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed what they considered the
most potent argument: that the guilty plea represents a sufficient
break in events to undermine the assumption that a subsequent
waiver of Miranda rights was the result of police coercion. 2 The
court conceded that a guilty plea factually distinguished Green from
Edwards, and that such a plea represents an important break in the
chain of events in the criminal process.73 Still, the court concluded
that a voluntary guilty plea, which was likely achieved through negoti-
ation between attorney and government, was consistent with the deci-
sion to deal with government officials only through an attorney. That
decision to interpose an attorney between oneself and the authorities
is precisely the interest Edwards seeks to protect.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that none of these factors,
either singly or in combination, act as the pivotal break in events ter-
minating Edwards' protection. In so ruling, however, the court often
seemed more concerned with not overstepping its proper role in the
judicial structure than with rejecting the government's arguments on
the merits. In other words, the Court of Appeals was deferring to the
Supreme Court to make any exceptions and qualifications to Edwards.
As the court concluded: "If [our assessment of how the Supreme
Court would apply its precedent to the facts in this case] is wrong,
then it is for the Court in this case or some future one to provide the
Leitfaden-the red thread-through its decisions leading to the cor-
rect result."74
Such guidance was not forthcoming. As previously mentioned,
although the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, certiorari was
70. Id at 989.
71. Id. at 989-90.
72. Green, 592 A.2d at 990. An analogy can be drawn to the Fourth Amendment
attenuation doctrine: the government can admit evidence if it can show, for example, that it
is sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality. For example, a confession that can be
traced back to a violation of that amendment may still be admissible under various circum-
stances. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
73. Green, 592 A.2d at 990 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).
74. Green, 592 A.2d at 991.
ultimately dismissed for mootness after the defendant was murdered a
few blocks from the Supreme Court building.75
Thus, the various questions posed by Green remain unanswered.
Although most commentators would instinctively agree that Edwards
rights cannot exist in perpetuity, exactly what factors signal an end to
those rights? The next section presents a framework for answering
that question by exploring in greater detail the concerns that animated
the Court from Miranda and Edwards to Roberson and Minnick. Why
has the Court built what Justice Scalia depicted as "prophylaxis built
upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable fairyland castle of imagined
constitutional restrictions upon law enforcement? 76
H. The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: A
Consideration of the Underlying Values
What interests do courts consider in crafting a right to counsel
when a suspect faces interrogation by authorities? There are four
goals or values which any court or scholar suggesting an alteration or
interpretation of Edwards should recognize and evaluate: ensuring a
voluntary, noncoerced confession; maintaining a bright-line rule; pro-
viding a framework for effective law enforcement; and adhering to
precedent.
A. To Ensure a Voluntary Confession
The objective of the rule crafted in Miranda and enforced
through Edwards is ensuring that a defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination is respected. In Miranda, the Justices feared that a sus-
pect would be compelled, either by police trickery or by the compel-
ling pressures inherent in custody, to make an incriminating
statement. To counteract these pressures, the Court required that the
suspect facing custodial interrogation be told of his rights. Only upon
a knowing and voluntary waiver 77 of these rights could it be said that
an inculpatory statement was made voluntarily rather than in response
to the coercion inherent in custodial police questioning.
Of course, in some sense, "no confession is really voluntary, in
that the person always is subject to-and some would insist controlled
75. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
76. Minnick v. United States, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. A detailed discussion of waiver under Miranda is beyond the scope of this Article.
But see North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (rejecting a proposed rule that waiv-
ers of Miranda rights be deemed involuntary absent an explicit assertion of waiver by the
suspect).
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by-both internal and external causal pressures."78 Despite inevitable
difficulties in assessing what is voluntary, the Court in Miranda, per-
haps overly simplistically, equated a voluntary confession with the ab-
sence of police coercion. A person subjected to custodial
interrogation who agrees to answer questions without being informed
of his right to remain silent is presumed by Miranda to be speaking
not based on his own free will but in response to the coercion inherent
in custodial interrogation. Similarly, a suspect who invokes his rights,
who is subject to police requestioning and continued requests to waive
those rights, and who ultimately waives those rights and makes incrim-
inating statements is presumed to be acting under compulsion prohib-
ited by the Fifth Amendment.
In Edwards, then, the Court devised a rule to implement the com-
mands of Miranda and to ensure a voluntary confession when the sus-
pect expresses a desire for the presence of counsel. The Court feared
that without an absolute prohibition on police reinterrogation, the po-
lice, after some initial period of honoring the request for counsel,
would nonetheless pressure a defendant in custody to change his mind
and speak to them. "Preserving the integrity of an accused's choice to
communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of Ed-
wards and its progeny .... 7 Edwards' ban on subsequent interroga-
tion, reinforced in Roberson and Minnick, not only communicates to
the suspect that the police intend to respect his constitutional rights, it
also is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into
waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. '80
Thus, any interpretation of Edwards that limits a suspect's right
to counsel must ensure that the government's ability to wear down a
defendant, to badger or coerce, is in no way strengthened. Any re-
striction on Edwards must not undermine this central concern for vol-
untariness consistently embraced by the Court from Miranda to the
present.
B. To Provide a Bright-Line Rule
One of the much lauded features of Edwards, consistently em-
phasized by the courts, is that it provides a bright-line rule governing
when police can reinitiate interrogation. For example, in Minnick the
Court noted that "[t]he merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clar-
78. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, supra note 4 at 261. See also
YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 15 (1980).
79. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1988).
80. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
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ity of its command and the certainty of its application.""1 In Rober-
son, the Court stressed that the Edwards rule provides "'clear and
unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement profession."'
Obviously clear rules serve many useful purposes. They provide
guidance to the police in determining the constitutionality of interro-
gations. Specific guidelines are particularly useful in the area of inter-
rogation where vague, general guidance may give the police
significant leeway to wear down the accused and persuade him to in-
criminate himself.8 3 Moreover, precise and defined rules help inform
the courts in determining when statements obtained during police in-
terrogations may be properly suppressed. Judicial resources which
would otherwise be expended making difficult assessments concerning
the admissibility of confessions are thus conserved.' Accordingly,
specificity in rules benefit the accused and the state alike.8 5
The importance of bright-line rules, however, should not be over-
stated. While it is a desirable end, it must be secondary to the content
of the rules. A bright-line rule could be established by declaring
either that no confessions are admissible or that all confessions are
inadmissible. The desire for a clear and precise rule gives us no way
to differentiate between these two extremes. While choosing between
two comparable approaches, the clarity of one rule is certainly a point
in its favor, but it cannot be the pre-eminent objective.
Edwards' bright line is not a laser, burning inexorably through
form and substance into infinity. When the factual circum-
stances of a case fall into a predictable, potentially recurring pat-
tern to which the underlying policy of Miranda and Edwards
toashine.pply, then so too does the bright-line 
of Edwards cease
The clarity of Edwards, moreover, may very well be overstated.
There are still significant gray areas surrounding the application of the
rule. For example, "custody"-a pre-requisite before Miranda warn-
ings are even required-has been poorly defined by the courts thus
81. Minnick v. United States, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990).
82. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988).
83. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) ("In the absence of such a bright-line
prohibition, the authorities. . . might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him
to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel's assistance."). Clear
guidelines also help the police determine when interrogation is permissible. See Davis v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (Clear rules help police decide whether to pro-
ceed with the interrogation.).
84. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 151.
85. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
86. Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298,310 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (Bryner, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
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far.' What constitutes an invocation of the right to counsel is still
being litigated. 8 Even the definition of interrogation has been subject
to some dispute.8 9 Perhaps most striking for its lack of definition is
the meaning of "initiation:" the police may obtain a waiver and
reinterrogate a suspect without counsel being present as long as the
suspect initiates the conversation.90 What constitutes initiation, how-
ever, is never spelled out in Edwards and has been a source of confu-
sion for the courts.91
The point, of course, is not to provide a definitive exploration of
these areas still unresolved after Edwards. Nor is it to say that the
existence of some open questions is evidence of the futility of being
precise. Rather, the point is simply that while the Court should strive
for a clear, precise, bright-line rule, that objective should not be
sought after at the expense of other, more important goals.
C. Societal Interest in Crime Control
While preservation of a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights
through prophylactic rules has certain benefits, these have always
been weighed, at least to some extent, against any concomitant reduc-
tion in law enforcement effectiveness. In other words, to the extent
that a proposed interpretation of Edwards enhances or decreases soci-
ety's ability to fight crime and convict the guilty, these costs should be
considered. 2
87. The Court in Miranda stated that its holding applied once a person "has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Subsequently, the Court, in essence reading out the latter part of
the sentence, has required that there be a "'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
ment' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). See,
e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (officer engaged in a routine traffic stop
does not create custody, and, therefore, officer need not obtain a waiver before asking
questions). Whether custody exists in a particular case is assessed on a case-by-case basis.
See generally Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (discussing factors in determin-
ing whether custody exists).
88. See Ainsworth, supra note 13.
89. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (defining interrogation
as express questions or their functional equivalent). For a consideration of the fact-specific
nature of defining interrogation, compare United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 717-18
(3d. Cir. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Rubio, 540 N.E.2d 189 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989) with
People v. Rowen, 314 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. App. Ct. 1981).
90. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.
91. See, e.g., James J. Fyfe, Oregon v. Bradshaw-What's Happening Here? 20 CRiM.
L. BuLL. 154 (1984).
92. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350,2356 (1994) ("In considering how
a suspect must invoke the right to counsel, we must consider the other side of the Miranda
equation: the need for effective law enforcement.").
The Court often has taken an inconsistent position on the key
questions of whether the Miranda and Edwards rules decrease the
number of confessions or inculpatory statements and, equally impor-
tant, whether any such decrease truly represents a "loss" to the sys-
tem. It should be stressed that these are two separate considerations:
first, do decisions like Miranda and Edwards decrease the number of
inculpatory statements acquired by the police; second, will any resul-
tant decrease stifle the ability of law enforcement personnel to fight
crime or convict the guilty. For example, it could be argued that Mi-
randa in fact has not significantly lowered the number of confessions
obtained by the authorities. Additionally, it may be contended that
Miranda does decrease the number of confessions, but that confes-
sions are unreliable and therefore should not play a significant role in
our adversary system. Finally, it could be argued that Miranda and
Edwards have substantially reduced the number of confessions ob-
tained by the police and that this is highly undesirable given the neces-
sity of relying on confessions in our criminal justice system.
Not surprisingly, the evidence with respect to the effect of Mi-
randa on the number of confessions obtained by the police is contro-
versial. Some studies support the contention of Miranda critics that
Miranda has led to a decrease in the number of suspects willing to
speak to the police after being informed of their rights. A study by
Professors Seeburger and Wettick, for example, demonstrated a sub-
stantial reduction in the number of confessions in Pittsburgh. They
found that prior to Miranda about sixty percent of suspected murder-
ers and robbers confessed; after Miranda that number was cut in
half.93
Other surveys, however, dispute any significant decrease in the
number of confessions. Significantly, the most recent data is fairly
consistent: while some declining confession rates could be docu-
mented immediately after the Miranda decision was handed down,
"within a year or two, both clearance and conviction rates were
thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels. Study after study con-
firmed this trend."94
There are various explanations for this phenomenon. First, the
police departments, realizing that Miranda was the law of the land,
93. Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburg-A Statistical
Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967). See also Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal
Mind, supra note 4, at 224-25 (discussing a number of similar studies).
94. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 435,456 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
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gradually adjusted to its requirements. Second, most suspects contin-
ued to talk, even after being informed of their rights, partly out of a
belief that they can talk their way out of trouble 5 And, in part, the
Court's interpretation of various aspects of the Miranda decision has
minimized its impact.96 Thus, even scholars like Professor Joseph
Grano who believe that Miranda was wrongly decided recognize that
"the concern over Miranda is much ado about nothing. Suspects, after
all, continue to confess, and the worst fears of the Miranda dissenters
simply have not materialized."'
Moreover, in evaluating the issues posed in Green, the critical
question is not whether Miranda has led to a decrease in confessions.
This article assumes that Miranda is not going to be overruled;98 in-
deed, even the most ardent critics of the decision concede that Mi-
randa is here to stay.' The precise question posed by this Article is:
95. Id. at 456-57.
96. To some extent, the limited effect of Miranda may be partly attributed to the
Court's narrowing of the protections over the years. In fact, "[t]he blanket prohibition
[adopted in Edwards] is one of the only significant constitutional protections for the crimi-
nal accused that has not been eroded considerably during the tenure of the Rehnquist
court." Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 297. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977) (discussing the meaning of custody; finding suspect not in custody when he volunta-
rily went to police station at the request of an officer); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985) (rejecting application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine when an initial
statement is obtained as a result of a Miranda violation but is otherwise voluntary); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements elicited in violation of Miranda may be used
for impeachment); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (defining initiation to in-
clude asking "what is going to happen to me now"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984) (adopting a public safety exception to Miranda); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292
(1990) (no compulsion exists-and no Miranda warnings are necessary-when person does
not know he is speaking to an officer).
97. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, supra note 4, at 266.
98. See, e.g., Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 1007, 1009
(1988) ("While outright reversal of Miranda remains a possibility, it is more likely that
Miranda will survive the current round of attacks. Interrogation warnings and waivers,
after all, have been the center-piece of the law of confessions for more than twenty years
and have integrated themselves into the criminal justice process."); Joseph D. Grano, Sell-
ing the Idea to Tell the Truth." The Professional Interrogator and Modem Confessions Law,
84 MICH. L. REv. 662, 664 (1986) ("The present Supreme Court would not have spawned
Miranda. Nevertheless, perhaps because of institutional considerations, the Court seems
disinclined to take the drastic step of overruling Miranda and rethinking the basic premises
of confessions law.").
99. See, e.g., comments of Justice Burger: "The meaning of Miranda has become rea-
sonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither
overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring). Of course, in an ultimate sense, any de-
crease in coerced confessions is a "cost" of the Fifth Amendment, and not merely of
Miranda.
what is the effect of the Edwards rule on the incidence of confessions,
and, even more precisely, how might the incidence of confessions be
affected by "breaking" the Edwards rights at some point in time. No
study has measured the specific effects of Edwards on confession
rates; most studies on the effect of Miranda were conducted before
Edwards was even decided. The studies documenting the effects of
Miranda, however, have some relevance here: overall, they demon-
strate that the police, even after informing suspects of their rights, are
able to obtain virtually the same number of confessions as before
Miranda.
In sum, the evidence thus far suggests that Miranda has not sig-
nificantly hampered law enforcement's ability to obtain incriminating
statements. Even if the evidence showed otherwise and the Edwards
rule translated into some quantifiably decreased number of confes-
sions, is that necessarily a "bad" thing? Does a loss of confessions
translate into a loss of convictions? Are statements of guilt elicited
from the defendant's mouth really a valuable tool of law
enforcement?
The Supreme Court has vacillated on the value and legitimacy of
confessions as an essential part of the adversary system. On the one
hand, the Justices have expressed some distrust for a system that sig-
nificantly relied on the use of a suspect's own words. A central prem-
ise underlying our criminal justice system is that "ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely se-
cured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out
of his own mouth." 00 Given some inherent uneasiness about any con-
fessions obtained during custodial interrogation, the government
should not rely primarily-or even significantly-on confessions for
effective prosecutions. Rather, the police should put their energy into
other, more reliable law enforcement techniques in order to convict
the guilty. Justice Warren's majority opinion in Miranda reflected this
position, minimizing the value of relying on the accused's own state-
ments. The Court in Miranda, for example, spoke about the "over-
statement of the 'need' for confessions" in obtaining convictions. 0 1
According to this philosophy, any decrease in confessions due to the
protection of individual rights would have a de minimis effect on the
100. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 587 (1976) (quoting Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
101. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481. The dissent characterized the majority as having "a
deep-seated distrust of all confessions." Id at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
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criminal justice system; confessions obtained during custodial interro-
gations are viewed as unreliable and unnecessary to the effective and
efficient workings of the criminal justice system.
On other occasions, and especially in recent years, many of the
Justices seem to take the opposite approach. In McNeil v. Wiscon-
sin,102 for example, the Court held that the accused's invocation of his
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel during a judicial proceeding did
not constitute invocation of the right to counsel under Edwards. The
Court emphasized that if it adopted a contrary rule:
most persons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be
unapproachable by police officers suspecting them of involve-
ment in other crimes, even though they have never expressed any
unwillingness to be questioned. Since the ready ability to obtain
uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good,
society would be the loser."03
Or, as the Court emphatically stated in Moran v. Burbine,104
"[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely 'desirable,' they are essen-
tial to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punish-
ing those who violate the law."'" 5
Which of these competing theories expressed over time by the
Supreme Court has more empirical support? Numerous attempts
have been made over the years to measure the "value" of confessions.
Despite the often vehement assertions of many Justices that confes-
sions play an essential role in convictions, empirical evidence,
although not definitive, supports the view that excluding confessions
will not damage law enforcement. In fact, a study demonstrates that
Miranda has not had a deleterious effect on criminal prosecutions,
102. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
103. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
104. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
105. Id. at 426 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977)). See
also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (There is no doubt that the public has a
legitimate "interest in the investigation of criminal activities."). Not only are confessions
viewed by many as a legitimate law enforcement technique, but they are also perceived as
important for the confessor and ultimately for reforming the criminal. Justice Scalia ex-
pressed this view in his dissenting opinion in Minnick:
While every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for the wrong-
doer to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves. Not only for
society, but for the wrongdoer himself, 'admission[ ] of guilt ... ,if not coerced,
[is] inherently desirable,' because it advances the goals of both 'justice and
rehabilitation.'
Minnick, 498 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting respectively United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23
(1974)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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even when there has been a decrease in the confession rate.10 6 For
example, although the Pittsburgh study found a significant decline in
confession rates, there was no significant change in clearance or con-
viction rates.0 7
Thus, contrary to popular perception, the suppression of a confes-
sion does not mean a brutal murderer is released to prey on the pub-
lic. Rather, most cases proceed as Edwards: after admission of the
defendant's own statements was found to violate Miranda, the defend-
ant was re-tried without the confession being admitted into evidence.
Based on other evidence, Edwards was again convicted of armed rob-
bery, armed burglary, and murder; he was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for the murder. 08
In sum, when evaluating a rule that limits-or fails to limit-the
scope and reach of Edwards, the effect on law enforcement must be
considered. Such consideration, however, should not succumb to plat-
itudes and cries of outrage lambasting the great harm of requiring the
police to inform suspects of their rights, and of requiring the police to
respect any invocation of rights. While there has always been much
outrage over Miranda, the reality is that the rule has not significantly
weakened law enforcement.
Yet even the possibility of hindering law enforcement, however
unquantifiable, should still be factored into any proposed interpreta-
tion of Edwards. Any proposed change in the Edwards rule must still
consider the possible ramifications on crime control. It may be that
Miranda/Edwards has had little cost because the courts have not con-
strued the rule to last in perpetuity. 0 9 If that interpretation of Ed-
wards is rejected and an invocation of counsel precludes any future
interrogation (or leads to the suppression of an illegally obtained con-
fession), the effect on the criminal justice system should be assessed.
The empirical research, however, strongly supports an argument that
the system adjusts, even to the loss of confessions. The current evi-
dence demonstrates that, if unable to rely on confessions, the police
develop equally-if not more-effective and reliable sources of
evidence.
106. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 94, at 457.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 459. This subsequent conviction was reversed by the Arizona Supreme
Court on the ground that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at the retrial. State v.
Edwards, 665 P.2d 59, 70 (Ariz. 1983). The case was remanded once again. "[O]n the day
the new trial was to begin, Edwards agreed to plead guilty in return for a fifteen-year
sentence." Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 94, at 460 n.62.
109. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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D. Adherence to Precedent
A final objective in devising a rule concerning a break in Ed-
wards' prohibition on reinterrogation is fidelity to precedent. Obvi-
ously, any court deciding these issues would not be writing on a blank
slate; consideration of the numerous cases where the Court has ex-
plored the scope and extent of Miranda is essential.
Such a task, however, is complicated by the inconsistent ap-
proaches of the Court. Specifically, many scholars contend that there
is an inconsistency between the waiver of the right to silence and the
right to counsel.110 As previously discussed, the Court forbids waiver
of the right to counsel once invoked (short of initiation or presence of
counsel) while the right to silence need only be "scrupulously
honored."
The Court has attempted to justify this distinction in several
ways. First, it points to the language in Miranda as supporting the
difference between the treatment of the right to silence and that of the
right to counsel. That language, however, is at best equivocal. The
effect of the two rights is at times described interchangeably in Mi-
randa: when either is invoked, the police must "cease" the interroga-
tion. In other passages, the Court modified this by adding that when
the right to counsel is invoked, interrogation must cease "until an at-
torney is present." ' But if the former statement-that interrogation
"must cease"- is not taken literally to mean that all police-initiated
interrogation must stop for all time and in all circumstances, why is
the latter viewed as absolute? In other words, why should the fact
that the ending point is specified-when counsel is present-be read
to mean that event is the only possible breaking point in Edwards?
Unless we read into the passage that an attorney being present is not
only a sufficient condition for terminating Edwards rights and permit-
ting reinterrogation, but also a necessary one, there is no reason to
view the rights differently. Both could potentially be ended by myriad
factors, as the Court recognized in Mosley. In fact, the Court has held
that the presence of counsel is not a necessary condition for reques-
tioning since a suspect's initiation allows the police to seek a valid
waiver and commence interrogation even in the absence of counsel.
Besides considering the language of Miranda, the Court norma-
tively tries to justify the distinction between the two rights on the
ground that the suspect is communicating two very different ideas
110. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Miranda After 25 Years: Alive and Well?, TRIAL, Mar.
1991, at 13, 15.
111. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
when he says "I don't want to talk without my attorney" rather than
"I don't want to talk." According to the Court, in the former invoca-
tion the suspect is expressing his inability to deal with the police at all
times, and on any topic, without his attorney as shield. In the latter,
the Court assumes that the suspect is merely indicating a temporary
desire: he does not now feel like speaking with the police, but he may
at a later time, particularly with different officers and especially on a
different subject.
Drawing such a distinction between waivers of the right to silence
and the right to counsel based on this perceived difference makes little
sense. Why is one viewed as a temporary desire and the other as per-
manent? Do suspects really have such different interests in mind
when they stop an interrogation or refuse to waive their rights? In
other words, is a suspect who insists that "he doesn't want to talk"
really expressing a different desire than one who states, "I don't want
to talk without my lawyer?" If part of the objective is to preserve the
choice of the defendant, the results in Mosley and Edwards are likely
irreconcilable. As Professor Kamisar argued:
The average person has no idea that different procedural safe-
guards are triggered by saying "I want to see a lawyer," (or "I
don't want to say anything until I see a lawyer") rather than "I
don't want to say anything," (or "I don't want to talk to you.")
If, after being advised both of his right to remain silent and his
right to counsel, a suspect replies that he wants to remain silent,
he may really be saying that he wants to remain silent until he
sees a lawyer. Indeed, I would argue that if, immediately after
being informed of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel, the suspect responds "I don't want to say anything," he
is invoking both rights."'
In essence, the justification for permitting reinterrogation when
the suspect invokes the right to remain silent, but not when he invokes
the right to counsel, is weak at best. In both cases, the subject is tell-
ing the police that he chooses not to cooperate or assist in the investi-
gation. The accused is as emphatic when insisting he will not speak as
when he declines to speak without his attorney.11 3
What significance does the inconsistency between Edwards and
Mosley have in deciding the duration of Edwards? In one sense, it
goes beyond the true focus of this paper, which is not to present a
112. Yale Kamisar, The Edwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the Court
Taketh Away, in Tim SutremEn CouRt:. TnriDs AND DEVELOPMENTs 1982-1983, 153, 157
(Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 1984).
113. Erickson, supra note 28, at 296. Judge Erickson believes that Edwards was
wrongly decided and should be more aligned with Mosley's totality of circumstances test.
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detailed criticism of Mosley or to suggest it be overturned, nor to urge
the Court to overrule Edwards. On the other hand, the dichotomy
goes to the core of this paper. The Court in Mosley was faced with
precisely the issue considered here: should we construe the rights
guaranteed in Miranda to last in perpetuity? What events or circum-
stances, if any, should render a subsequent waiver of these rights
valid?
M. Possible Breaking Points in the Edwards Rule: A
Consideration of the Values
Thus, the question becomes: given these divergent and sometimes
conflicting goals, when may the police obtain a valid waiver of the
Miranda/Edwards rights after a suspect initially asserts his desire to
proceed only through counsel. There are a number of possible
"events" that arguably should break the protection of Edwards, per-
mitting the police to obtain a valid waiver despite the suspect's re-
quest for the assistance of a lawyer. The most significant include: (1) a
break in custody; (2) the end of the offense for which the defendant
invoked his right to counsel; and (3) the passage of time. A totality of
the circumstances test could also be employed.
These potential termination points for Edwards will be contrasted
with another possible answer to the question of when Edwards rights
end: no police-initiation is allowed under any circumstances once the
right to counsel has been invoked. That is, once the suspect asserts a
right to counsel, the police must interrogate him only in the presence
of a lawyer or obtain a valid waiver based on the suspect's own
initiation.
A. The End of Custody
Virtually every court that has considered this issue has held (or
noted in dicta) that a break in custody permits the police to reap-
proach a suspect who had previously asserted his Edwards rights and
to try to obtain a waiver.114 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, in
finding that a break in custody dissolves a defendant's Edwards claim,
114. See, e.g., Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1988); McFadden v.
Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 660-61 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306,
1308-09 (9th Cir. 1982); People v. Trujillo, 773 P.2d 1086, 1091-92 (Colo. 1989); State v.
Bymes, 375 S.E.2d 41, 41-42 (Ga. 1989); State v. Norris, 768 P.2d 296, 301-02 (Kan. 1989);
Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1029-30 (Wyo. 1983); State v. Kyger, 787 S.W.2d 13, 24-25
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); United States ex reL Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125-26
(7th Cir. 1987).
held that subsequent confessions obtained from police-initiated inter-
rogation are admissible if there has been an intervening break in cus-
tody even if the police wrongfully ignore a defendant's request for
counsel.115 In that case, Dunkins v. Thigpen,116 the suspect was ar-
rested and brought to the courthouse on a rape and murder charge.
After being read his rights, the defendant replied, "Before I talk any-
more now, I would like to talk to my lawyer or either my mama or
somebody... ."I7 The deputies asked a few more questions, put the
suspect in a line-up, and then returned him to his place of work. The
next morning the defendant was picked up for a polygraph test which
he had agreed to take the day before. He was again returned to his
job; later that day he was brought in for more questioning. After an
hour or so of questioning, the defendant signed a waiver of his rights
and confessed to the crime. The Court of Appeals held that the con-
fession was admissible: the breaks in custody ended the need for the
prophylactic Edwards rule, and the subsequent waiver of rights was
voluntary." 8
The Ninth Circuit also adopted a break in custody rule based on
similar facts. In United States v. Skinner,"9 the suspect was ques-
tioned on July tenth at an undisclosed location concerning a murder.
He was read his rights and agreed to talk. Shortly thereafter, he vol-
untarily went to the police station to answer further questions. 20 He
was again advised of his rights and signed a waiver form. The session
ended after almost two hours when the suspect said he wanted to
speak to an attorney before answering further questions. Skinner left
the station. The following morning he was arrested for the murder.
In the car on the way to the station he was advised of his rights; the
defendant said he understood, agreed to answer questions and con-
fessed immediately thereafter. 12' At the station, he was once again
advised of his rights; he signed a waiver form and again confessed.
Skinner moved to suppress the confessions, arguing that because
he had asserted his right to counsel at the July tenth interrogation, the
police could not obtain a valid waiver the next day because he had not
initiated the conversation and his attorney was not present. The court
disagreed: "We find Edwards to be distinguishable. Edwards was
115. Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1988).
116. Id.
117. Id at 396.
118. Id. at 398.
119. 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
120. 1d. at 1308.
121. Id.
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under arrest and in custody continuously from the time he requested
an attorney through the next day when the guard told him 'he had to'
talk and officers interrogated him again. Skinner however, was not in
continuous custody."' 2
Although the Supreme Court has not considered this issue di-
rectly, in dicta the Court appeared to endorse the principle that a
break in custody permits the police to reapproach a suspect to try to
obtain a waiver of her rights. In McNeil v. Wisconsin,1 3 the Court
described the holding in Edwards and its progeny as follows: "If the
police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel
(assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect's state-
ments are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible .... ,"124
Thus, the argument would be that Edwards applies only as long
as a suspect remains in custody after initially asserting his Miranda
rights. A suspect released from continuous custody may be contacted
by the police and issued new Miranda warnings if subjected to custo-
dial interrogation, and that police-initiated contact will not be barred
by Edwards.
What is it about the break in custody that extinguishes a defend-
ant's Edwards rights? There are several possible reasons why continu-
ous custody might be required before applying Edwards. First, it
could be that such a break in custody permits the defendant an easy
opportunity to consult with a lawyer. That seemed to be an important
factor for the court in Skinner; it noted that "[W]hen Skinner left the
station that afternoon, he had the opportunity to contact a lawyer or
to seek advice from friends and family if he chose to do so." 25 Skin-
ner, however, was pre-Minnick In Minnick, the Supreme Court held
that consultation with counsel does not substitute for the presence of
counsel at the interrogation. 126 The police may not approach a sus-
pect and attempt to obtain a waiver of rights simply because the sus-
pect has had the opportunity to meet with an attorney. Thus, this
possible explanation for a break in custody rule is no longer valid.
A second possible justification for the break in custody rule is
that it extinguishes the coercive pressures present when the defendant
first invoked the assistance of counsel. For example, the district court
122. Id. at 1309 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
123. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
124. Id. at 177 (emphasis added). See also Richardson, supra note 19, at 165 (support-
ing a break in custody as "the only possible 'significant event' at which the Edwards pre-
sumption should end").
125. United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
126. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990).
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noted in Green (before reversing itself on other grounds) that "unlike
in Roberson, Mr. Green was not continuously in custody of the police
and therefore arguably subject to the same coercive pressure in Janu-
ary 1990 as he was in July of 1989." The point would be that the Ed-
wards rule has established an irrefutable presumption of coercion only
where the circumstances reveal a real risk of coercion. When there is
a break in custody, that presumption would not be indulged.
This argument has little merit. First, Edwards establishes a pre-
sumption of coercion; coercive factors should not be considered anew
in each circumstance. Any subsequent interrogation must occur in
custody for the Miranda/Edwards protections to apply, and the Court
has been consistent in noting that custodial interrogation is inherently
coercive. Why does the fact that the defendant experienced a few
hours of freedom'2 7 make it less coercive when the police reap-
proached him, in a custodial setting, to obtain a waiver of his previ-
ously asserted rights? The Roberson majority, in distinguishing
Edwards from Mosely, emphasized that a suspect's decision to request
an attorney raises the presumption that he is unable to deal with the
authorities even with respect to a completely different offense. 128
Even a new set of warnings, apprising the defendant that he could
(again) assert his rights fails to extinguish any coercion. Why would a
break in custody do so? There is nothing about this event that re-
motely suggests that the suspect has changed his or her mind and now
wishes to speak directly to the police.129 Indeed, if any assumption
can be made, it should be that a suspect in this position would want to
pursue precisely the same course as before: that is, deal with the po-
lice only with the buffer and protection of counsel.
A break in custody does not alleviate the danger that the suspect
will feel his will is being overborne by police who reapproach him to
obtain a waiver. If anything, the break in custody rule practically en-
courages police to badger and wear down the will of the suspect. The
police could circumvent Edwards simply by releasing a person and
then reapprehending him, reMirandizing him, and hoping to obtain a
waiver. It is easy to imagine this rule being abused; the police could
release a suspect for a short period of time (even hours) in order to
127. In many cases the suspect was only released overnight and questioning continued
the next day. See, eg., Skinner, 667 F.2d at 1308; Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 396
(11th Cir. 1988).
128. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988).
129. Thus, a break in custody cannot be considered initiation by the suspect. It is not
an expression of the suspect's desire to open up further dialogue with the police on the
subject of the initial interrogation. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S 1039, 1044 (1983).
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break the link, and then, upon taking the suspect into custody, obtain
a valid waiver by rereading his rights. Although the police might be-
lieve that the cost of releasing some suspects might pose too great a
risk, it would be a viable option in numerous circumstances.
In fact, as a psychological tactic, the break in custody "routine"
might work very well: by freeing the suspect, the police can act like
the "good cop," win favor with the person, and then hope that the
suspect will eventually agree to speak without an attorney being pres-
ent. Yet this behavior, rather than ending the coerciveness of custody,
likely enhances the coercive effect. The uncertainty of fate that being
released from custody and then reapprehended entails is, in some cir-
cumstances, more coercive than continual custody. It is difficult not to
view the reinterrogations that occurred in both Skinner and Dunkins,
coming in both cases after the suspects had asserted their desire to
speak only through counsel, as precisely the kind of badgering Ed-
wards was designed to avoid. The fact that both defendants had been
released from custody after asserting their rights does nothing to mini-
mize this coerciveness.
Perhaps those who contend that a break in custody "erases" the
request for counsel really are saying that there needs to be some way
to minimize the costs of Edwards, and this line at least provides a
clear, easily enforceable ending point. In other words, the belief is
that Edwards rights cannot last forever, and the end of custody seems
like a reasonable, clear termination. An analogy might be drawn to
the attenuation doctrine in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. There,
the Court has held that, even when there has been an earlier, coerced
confession, the court will not automatically exclude the subsequent
confession because it feels the cost is too great; at some point the rela-
tionship between the two confessions should be viewed as
attenuated. 30
This argument-that some breaking point is needed for Edwards,
and that the end of custody provides at least a clear termination
point-has two dubious assumptions: first, that the costs of Edwards
otherwise would be too great, and, second, that the definition of cus-
tody constitutes a bright-line rule.
The first assumption-that Edwards lasting forever would prove
too costly-has been discussed previously. There is no reliable evi-
dence that the retention of Edwards rights significantly decreases the
130. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654
(4th Cir. 1987).
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number of confessions, or, more importantly, decreases the number of
convictions.
The latter argument, that custody provides a clear, easy to en-
force breaking point, is also assailable. First, of course, the value of
having a bright-line rule is only as great as its other justifications. And
here the justification is weak. As previously discussed, a break in cus-
tody does not inevitably eliminate the coercive environment which
prompted the initial request for counsel.
Second, it is not certain that a break in custody would be a bright-
line rule easily assessed by the courts. Even those judges who accept
this as a significant event extinguishing Edwards rights recognize the
potential for abuse, and therefore assert the caveat that the release
from custody cannot be contrived or used as a pretext simply to per-
mit future interrogations. Precisely how the Court is going to make
this factual determination is not clear. In other areas of criminal pro-
cedure, pretext arguments have not generally represented the courts
highest achievement for clarity and consistency.131
Moreover, even defining custody for purposes of this rule may be
problematic. Courts have struggled with the meaning of custody for
purposes of determining whether Miranda applies in the first place. 132
This would add yet another layer of confusion. In everyday parlance,
a break in custody seems easy to define; it implies a release from
prison or jail. At a minimum, a person previously restricted in free-
dom of movement would be free to go about his everyday business as
he chooses. Some courts, however, define "break in custody" more
broadly, and indicate that a change in the "level" of custody would
suffice for showing a break. In other words, the level of intensity in
the manner of incarceration is analyzed. If a defendant in jail no
longer experiences the same degree of restrictive environment that he
previously experienced- if the circumstances are less coercive than
before-that will be considered a break in the element of custody.
For example, in Green it was argued-and accepted initially by the
131. See generally United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990). Com-
pare United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[S]o long as police do
no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in
doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.") with United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (The court set forth a test to determine if police action
is pretextual: "a court should ask not whether the officer could validly have made the stop,
but whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop
in the absence of the invalid purpose." Here the court needs to determine usual practice
and whether the officer deviated from it.).
132. See Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994). See also supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
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trial court-that Green was not in custody during the five month in-
terval between interrogations because he was confined at a youth
center and "not with the police" during that time. Thus, the court
concluded that the "same" coercive pressures were not at stake. If
courts were to undertake such an analysis, and determine whether the
suspect felt under compulsion in the time period between interroga-
tions, any illusion that the break in custody rule is a bright-line test is
destroyed. For a court to undertake, in every case, a psychological
analysis of the conditions of incarceration and their effect on the sus-
pect would prove extraordinarily difficult, time consuming, and poten-
tially arbitrary.
Thus, I conclude that a break in custody, while it may aid law
enforcement by opening up a window of opportunity for questioning a
suspect who has invoked his rights, should not constitute an event
that, by itself, eliminates the Edwards presumption. A break in cus-
tody seems unrelated to the notion of voluntariness in the sense of
implementing the suspect's choice to deal with the authorities only
through counsel. It does not represent the end of coercion during the
time of the interrogation. Although ostensibly it would be a bright-
line rule, the factual inquiries raised above render it more of a case-
by-case inquiry than a bright-line rule.
B. The End of the Offense
Most courts and commentators assume that if the defendant as-
serts the right to counsel when being questioned on an offense, and
"liability" for that offense ends, Edwards should not bar subsequent
waivers of police initiated interrogations. The end of an offense might
be defined in many ways; it could include the government's decision
to drop charges, the expiration of the statute of limitations, conviction
for the offense, or sentencing. 33 Thus, it can be argued that Edwards'
prophylactic rule dissolves once a defendant is convicted and/or sen-
tenced for the offense for which he invoked his Edwards rights. Judge
Bryner argued that sentencing represents a reasonable breaking point
for Edwards:
When a person is confined in custody solely as a sentenced pris-
oner, with no charges pending, the issue of guilt resolved by a
final verdict, and the terms and conditions of future confine-
ment clearly defined in a written judgment that is a matter of
133. Justice O'Connor suggested sentencing as the termination point for the Edwards
presumption during oral argument in Green. Interrogation; Invocation of Right to Counse4
Voluntary Confession Following Consultation and Guilty Plea, 61 U.S.L.W. 3453, 3454 (Jan-
uary 5, 1993).
public record, the anxiety and uncertainty that support Mi-
randa's finding of inherent coercion simply cease to exist. When
custody is not related to any pending or unresolved matter, it
seems to me that there is little cause for concern that a police
officer will "appear to control the suspect's fate."1"
In Green, the argument was taken one step further. The govern-
ment argued that Green's guilty plea in the drug case made Edwards
inapplicable to the murder case. Such a plea, the government main-
tained, represented a break in the suspect's status as a pretrial arres-
tee. A suspect who has pled guilty is unlikely to feel badgered if the
police subsequently approach him, repeat the Miranda warnings, and
seek to question him about an unrelated offense. The plea in essence
represents a waiver of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. Accordingly, as, the govern-
ment urged in Green,
[b]ecause a guilty plea marks a sharp break in the proceedings,
and because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the same Fifth
Amendment right that is protected by the Miranda and Edwards
rules, it does not make sense to automatically treat a defendant
who has pleaded guilty as if he were still a pretrial arrestee. To
the contrary, the entry of a guilty plea to the charge as to which
the defendant invoked his Edwards rights should be sufficient to
lift the irrebuttable presumption that any subsequent waiver of
that right is the product of police coercion.13 5
In other words, where the status of the defendant has changed dra-
matically, as it does after an adjudication of guilt, the continued appli-
cation of Edwards' irrebutable presumption is unreasonable.
Concededly, a guilty plea, or an adjudication of guilt after trial
changes a defendant's status. But the question is whether that change
of status should make any difference for purposes of applying Ed-
wards. A defendant still stands in the same position with respect to
the critical issue: does this event in any way cast doubt on the defend-
ant's continuing desire to deal with the authorities only through the
assistance of counsel? There is no reason to believe that a guilty plea
or any other adjudication of the offense alters this desire on the part
of the defendant. If anything, the plea or resolution of the offense
likely reinforces the defendant's belief in the necessity of counsel. A
guilty plea typically results from the advice of counsel, which is consis-
tent with the defendant's original election to deal with government
134. Kochutin v. State, 813 P2d 298,309 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (Bryner, C.J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)).
135. Brief for the United States at 15-16, United States v. Green, 113 S. Ct. 1835 (1992)
(No. 91-1521).
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officials only through an attorney. Thus, as Professor Richardson
concludes:
[a]lIthough a guilty plea... is a place at which a bright line rule
could easily be drawn, there is no justification for ending Ed-
wards protection at this point. A guilty plea does not change the
coercive nature of continued custody .... Indeed, for a suspect
such as Green who was awaiting sentencing, coerciveness might
be heightened after the suspect pleads guilty because he desires
to do everything possible to receive a favorable sentencing rec-
ommendation. A guilty plea also does not indicate a desire to
deal with interrogators without the presence of a lawyer.'36
When the defendant first invokes the right to counsel upon being
questioned about offense A, that assertion evidences his perceived in-
ability to deal with the police without the aid of counsel. As the
Supreme Court made clear in Roberson, that invocation of the right to
the assistance of counsel is presumed to apply to interrogation con-
cerning any offense; the defendant is declaring his belief that for all
interrogations on any topic, he needs the assistance of an attorney.
Disposition of offense A does nothing to eradicate this presumption.
The only argument would be that pleading guilty or being sentenced
after trial on offense A is equivalent to a defendant who, after assert-
ing his rights under Edwards, changes his mind and initiates conversa-
tion on that topic. In that situation, the police would presumably be
free to obtain a waiver with respect to offense A as well as any other
possible topic. In other words, pleading guilty could be seen as initia-
tion under Edwards and Bradshaw, inviting the government to reopen
dialogue with the defendant on any topic in the absence of counsel.
But pleading guilty, or proceeding through trial is not the
equivalent of initiation. When the defendant initiates discussion on
the topic of the interrogation, a critical presumption is erased because
the action specifically reflects a considered decision on the part of the
defendant to recontact the police alone.137 Pleading guilty or being
tried does not reflect that sentiment. Rather, a guilty plea or trial usu-
ally reflects the defendant's choice to face the authorities only through
the intermediary of counsel. As the Court of Appeals in Green
recognized:
[W]hile the knowing and voluntary plea [of guilty] presumably
demonstrated that acceptance of personal responsibility and
not the pressures of custody caused him to incriminate himself,
it also was consistent with his original election to deal with gov-
136. Richardson, supra note 19, at 164-65.
137. To some extent, this turns on the courts' interpretation of initiation. To the extent
that the courts interpret it broadly, this argument loses some of its persuasiveness.
ernment officials only through an attorney. Indeed, from de-
fendant's viewpoint the fact that counsel had negotiated a plea
to a lesser charge ... would only have confirmed the wisdom of
his choice to insist on the shield of legal representation. 138
Accordingly, a plea of guilty or any other final disposition of an
offense should not be viewed as breaking points for Edwards rights
because they are consistent with the defendant's election to interact
with the police only through counsel. Nor does a defendant somehow
lose all his Fifth Amendment privileges upon pleading guilty or even
being sentenced. By pleading guilty, "[a] witness does not lose his
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify concerning other matters or
transactions not included in his conviction or plea agreement."' 39
There is no basis for concluding that a defendant upon pleading guilty
to one offense somehow gave up his right to counsel at subsequent
custodial interrogations, particularly since the invocation of the right
is not offense-specific.
C. Time Elapsed Between the Invocation of Counsel and the Second
Approach
Another possible factor in assessing the application of the Ed-
wards presumption is time. Should courts consider the amount of
time between the initial assertion of the right to counsel and any sub-
sequent interrogation? The Courts' decisions applying Edwards have
all involved repeated police-initiated questions within a short time
span after the suspect's arrest and original invocation of the right to
counsel. In Edwards, for example, the police reinitiated interrogation
only one day after the suspect invoked the right to counsel.140 In Rob-
erson,14' as well as in Minnick, 42 the interval between invocation of
the right to counsel and requestioning by the police was only three
days. In Green, however, the police reinitiated questioning five
months after Green's assertion of his Edwards right. Should the
signficantly greater passage of time rebut the presumption of
Edwards?
There are strong arguments for viewing the passage of time as a
breaking point in Edwards. First, it is reasonable to assume that a
person changes his mind over time. After some passage of time-for
138. United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 990 (D.C. 1991).
139. United States v. Tmdle, 808 F.2d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1114 (1989) (emphasis in original).
140. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478-79.
141. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678 (1988).
142. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148-49 (1990).
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example, several years-the presumption that the defendant wishes to
proceed only in the presence of counsel very well might change.
While there may be nothing about being released from custody or
pleading guilty that would logically demonstrate a change of mind
(and, in fact, such events more likely reinforce the original election),
time often changes the perspective of individuals on many issues.
Why not at least allow the police to ask the defendant whether time
changed his desire to be questioned only in the presence of counsel?
Concededly, if a person does change her mind over time, she is
free to initiate conversation on the offense and thereby invite the po-
lice to reapproach the suspect, and possibly to obtain a valid a waiver
under Edwards to question the suspect outside the presence of coun-
sel. Thus, it could be argued that it is safer to maintain the presump-
tion that those who do not initiate still wish to interject an attorney in
their dealings with the authorities, despite the passage of time. But a
presumption must be based on some factual basis; and it may be as
logical to assume that individuals who do not initiate conversation
with police over time are perfectly willing to discuss the issue with the
police without an attorney as it is to presume that they have not
changed their mind. The question here is: where should the presump-
tion lie? An argument could be made that the Edwards presump-
tion-that an individual's initial desire, expressly asserted, for counsel
during interrogation on any offense-loses vitality over some period
of time. Thus, some argue the passage of time should constitute a
significant event terminating a person's Edwards rights.
Second, some argue that time should break Edwards rights be-
cause the presumption of coercion should not be indulged forever.
That is, a suspect whose rights are respected for a significant period of
time will not feel badgered when ultimately reapproached by the po-
lice. Thus, a core purpose behind Edwards' prophylactic rule is pre-
served. As the court of appeals noted in Green:
There is no question that to the extent Edwards is 'designed to
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his pre-
viously asserted Miranda rights' ... that danger is reduced when
the police have made no effort to interrogate the defendant for
more than five months after his assertion of rights.143
In other words, the fear in Edwards that repeated attempts to ques-
tion the suspect will exacerbate the already significant compulsion to
143. United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 988 (D.C. 1991). Of course, in Mosley, a
two hour time gap was considered significant! See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying
text.
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speak is significantly lessened when the police make no effort to ques-
tion the suspect for a substantial period of time.
Third, to the extent that a break in Edwards rights after a certain
period of time permits reinterrogation, the goal of law enforcement is
enhanced because it increases the flow of potentially valuable infor-
mation. Moreover, it may be fairer to the police to allow them the
opportunity to obtain a waiver after a certain passage of time:
[i]t is one thing to require the police to determine whether a
suspect has recently invoked the right to counsel under Mi-
randa. It is quite another to require the police to determine
whether a suspect in long term custody has ever invoked the
Edwards right at any time, in any place, during any interrogation
by any police officer.1'
These arguments have significant merit. Regardless, the passage
of time, by itself, should not be enough to eradicate the suspect's Ed-
wards rights. While the need for a bright-line rule should not be over-
stated, it seems to have a special poignancy here. How is a court-or
a police officer in the first instance-to draw the line and determine
how long is long enough? If six months, for example, is deemed long
enough, why not six weeks? Can one be rationally defended over an-
other (beyond the fact that one is longer than the other)?14 5 It is not
simply the matter of finding a bright-line rule. To the extent one errs,
making the time interval too short, the fear of badgering and coercing
confessions in violation of the Fifth Amendment becomes all too real.
The passage of time, moreover, if spent in custody, may actually
increase the coercive pressure to respond to interrogation, not dissi-
pate it."'4 "While in custody, a suspect lives a restricted life: he is told
when to wake up, what to do while he is awake, and what time he
144. Brief for the United States at 20 n.6, Green, 592 A.2d 990.
145. See Richardson, supra note 19, at 164 (arguing that a passage of time rule does not
allow for bright-line analysis). The oral arguments in Green demonstrate this difficulty.
J. White: Edwards wears out?
[Deputy Solicitor General] Roberts: The presumption outlives its purpose.
J. O'Connor: Is three months enough?
Roberts: Yes.
J. O'Connor: Is one month enough?
Roberts: Yes.
J. O'Connor: Is two months enough?
Roberts: Yes.
J. O'Connor: Is two days enough?
Roberts: Two days is probably not enough.
Interrogation; Invocation of Right to Counse4 Voluntary Confession Following Consultation
and Guilty Plea, 61 U.S.L.W. 3453, 3454 (Jan. 5, 1993).
146. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153 (coercive pressures "may increase as custody is
prolonged.").
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must go to bed."147 The atmosphere of incarceration works to under-
mine a person's free will over time, not enhance it.
Thus, the passage of time should not be a factor ending the pro-
phylactic protection of Edwards for two reasons. First, determining
case by case the passage of time sufficient to break Edwards would
eliminate the bright-line nature of that rule. Second, the passage of
time spent in custody does not eliminate the coercive influences which
lay at the heart of the rationale for Edwards protections.
D. A Totality of Circumstances Approach
As discussed above, neither a break in custody, a disposition on
the initial charge, nor the passage of time should constitute events that
terminate Edwards' protection. Such an argument means that a sus-
pect who invokes his right to counsel on one occasion can never be
reapproached by the police in the absence of counsel at any future
point. That prospect, of course, is troubling. For example, a 17 year
old is picked up for questioning concerning a car theft. He is briefly
interrogated at the police station. At one point he says that he wants
to see a lawyer; the questions cease and the teenager is released. The
police never approach him again until ten years later, when he is a
suspect in a murder investigation. He is arrested, read his Miranda
warnings, and he signs a waiver form. He then makes several inculpa-
tory statements regarding the murder. Should the confession be sup-
pressed because it violated Edwards? According to the arguments
discussed above, that result seems likely. 48 It is difficult to escape the
feeling that this result is too extreme, that it cannot be what the Court
in Edwards contemplated happening. What is to prevent an anticipa-
tory assertion of the right if there is no offense-specific limit, no time-
tethering, or continual custody requirement to the Edwards rule?
That is, what would prevent a person from writing to the police de-
partment: "If I am ever in custodial interrogation, I hereby invoke my
right to counsel." The Court has suggested that anticipatory elections
are illegitimate,"49 but why would this be so?
147. Richardson, supra note 19, at 163.
148. It might be possible to argue that the invocation of the right to counsel does not
apply to crimes not yet committed at the time of invocation. That is, although Edwards is
not crime-specific, it does not extend to crimes not yet committed. Amicus makes this
argument in Green. See also United States v. Hall, 905 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1990).
149. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180 n.1 (1991).
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Although I have strong distrust for a system that permits any
waiver of rights outside the presence of counsel,150 if such waivers are
allowed, the above example seems grossly unfair. Is there an alterna-
tive? There are at least three possible answers to this problem.
One approach would be to accept the conclusion that Edwards
rights persist in perpetuity, and argue that such a result is acceptable if
not desirable. With respect to the values discussed in Section II, an
advocate of this approach would argue that it does not significantly
hamper effective law enforcement. Edwards, after all, does not pre-
clude the police from investigating the crime. The police simply must
use resources outside of the defendant's own words against him at
trial. Hopefully, other investigatory techniques can fill the void left by
the inability to use confessions. Law enforcement interests are actu-
ally enhanced if these other investigatory methods prove more relia-
ble than a confession obtained after an initial assertion of Edwards
rights.
Further, Edwards does not absolutely preclude the police from
speaking to the defendant. A person who wishes to is still free to
approach the police and volunteer information concerning the crime.
The police can even initiate an interrogation so long as they ensure
that the suspect is represented by counsel at the interrogation. If that
course of action results in fewer confessions because suspects choose
not to speak on the advice of the attorney, that is the price of the
suspect's knowing and intelligent exercise of his rights.
Additionally, this approach would preserve the bright-line nature
of the Edwards rule. The rule would be clear: once a suspect invokes
the right to counsel, any subsequent waiver would be invalid absent
initiation by the defendant. Finally, it fulfills the Edwards goals of
ensuring voluntary confessions and eradicating coercion because it
provides the penultimate assurance against police badgering and
wearing down of the will of the suspect.
It is unlikely, however, that the Court would accept the view that
Edwards lasts forever. Recent pronouncements by the Court indicate
a growing acceptance of the value of confession and the appropriate
role it plays in law enforcement. The Court's most recent holdings
elaborating on Edwards rights suggest a desire to limit, rather than
150. I am inclined to agree with the suggestion of Professor Charles Ogletree that all
suspects in custody "should have a nonwaivable right to consult with a lawyer before being
interrogated by the police." Charles J. Ogletree. Are Confessions Really Good for the
Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. Rnv. 1826, 1842 (1987).
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expand, its application. In McNeil v. Wisconsin,151 for example, the
Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, the assertion of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel does not imply an assertion of the Fifth
Amendment Right to Counsel recognized in Miranda. The Court fur-
ther stated that the assertion of Sixth Amendment rights should not
be so construed as a matter of policy. Such a construction would not
promote the goal of preventing "badgering," since the suspect would
not have requested counsel during an interrogation before, and would
in fact "seriously impede effective law enforcement" by making sus-
pects unapproachable by the police. Admissions of guilt, the Court
concluded, are not merely desirable; they are essential to "finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.' 1 52 Moreover, a
court intent on limiting the reach of Edwards would simply stretch to
find initiation whenever possible. In this way, the legal meaning of
initiation might be distorted, as well as limiting a suspect's rights.
Assuming then, that the Court will want to find some breaking
point to Edwards, what should constitute that change of circumstance
so significant as to eliminate the presumption that any waiver is invol-
untary? As described above, none of the factors traditionally sug-
gested, in isolation, should end the prophylactic protection of
Edwards. Thus, some suggest (as was argued in Green) that a totality
of circumstances test should be utilized. In other words, Edwards
would be brought more in line with the result in Mosley, and the ques-
tion would become whether the defendant's rights were "scrupulously
honored." The factors discussed above would all be considered, as
would possibly the opportunity to consult with a lawyer and whether
the interrogation concerns a new crime.
The idea is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Although none of the factors in isolation justify deviating from Ed-
wards, the factors considered in conjunction with each other might.
This approach would be faithful to precedent by aligning Edwards
with Mosley (although it might be inconsistent with others, as will be
discussed below.) Arguably, it strikes the best balance between re-
specting the suspect's right against self-incrimination and the interests
of law enforcement by permitting reinterrogation except where it is
shown to be coercive in the circumstances.
151. 501 U.S. 171 (1991). In June 1994, the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of Ed-
wards by requiring a clear and unequivocal assertion of counsel. Davis v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355-56 (1994).
152. McNei 501 U.S. at 181 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S 412, 426 (1986)).
It is unlikely, however, that the Court would endorse this option,
nor would it be particularly desirable. The Court has repeatedly em-
phasized that the merit of Edwards lies in its clarity and the certainty
of its application.5 3 It explicitly rejected the opportunity to utilize a
totality of the circumstances approach in Edwards, Minnick, and
Roberson.
There may, however, be a third approach, a middle ground that
lies between a totality of circumstances test and a ruling that Edwards
lasts in perpetuity. That is, the court may consider some of the factors
but confine them narrowly. This approach lets certain events cut off
the Edwards presumption against waiver, but does so in a very narrow
circumstance. That limited circumstance would be a combination of
time and custody, and both terms must be precisely prescribed. Thus,
a possible rule could be: police initiated custodial interrogation of a
suspect may occur even though that person had earlier invoked his
Edwards rights if: (1) that person has been released from custody, and
(2) at least six months has transpired since the release from custody
following the initial assertion of his right to counsel. Custody would
be defined as being under arrest or the functional equivalent to arrest.
A person whose freedom to choose how to spend his time, or whose
ability to choose where to go, is restricted by the government would
be viewed as "in custody." A defendant switched from a maximum
security prison to a less intrusive but still restricted environment
should still be considered as being in custody.
There are several arguments in support of this rule. First, the
combination of release from custody and the passage of a significant
period of time mitigate against police coercion. A suspect who asserts
his Edwards rights, and has those rights respected for six months dur-
ing which the suspect is not in custody, will likely not believe she is a
victim of police badgering. The facts of a particular case may show
otherwise, and a defendant of course would be free to argue that such
facts defeat the voluntariness of the waiver. But to indulge in a pre-
sumption of coercion after six months and a release from custody
seems unnecessary.
Second, the release from custody requirement ensures that the
time interval does not serve to increase the coercion, as may happen
when the passage of time occurs while the accused is in custody. The
person must be released from custody for at least six months after the
initial invocation. During this period, any residual coercive effects of
153. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990).
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that custodial situation will probably have dissipated, at least enough
to allow the suspect to make a voluntary decision whether to speak to
the authorities. The six-month requirement also ensures against the
police using a release from custody as a pretext for badgering or co-
ercing a suspect into making an incriminating statement. It is highly
unlikely that the police will release a suspect for the sole purpose of
breaking Edwards if they must wait six months before police-initiated
reinterrogation can begin.
Third, this rule also provides clear guidance to the police about
when they may reapproach a suspect. Although the circumstances for
such reinterrogation are, concededly, signficantly limited, the officers
should be fairly easily able to determine whether they may lawfully
attempt to question a person who has invoked the right to counsel. Of
course, the rule requires that the government keep fairly detailed
records concerning the time of the initial invocation and the date of
the release from custody.
The rule also requires that officers, before engaging in custodial
interrogation, check computer databases to ascertain whether the pro-
tection of Edwards applies. While this may seem somewhat onerous,
the computer capabilities of most police departments should minimize
the burdens. An officer who is unsure should err on the side of cau-
tion and only question the suspect, if at all, in the presence of counsel
or upon the suspect's own initiation. It should be stressed that these
precautions need only be taken when the police wish both to take
someone into custody and to interrogate them. Custodial interroga-
tion is not casual interaction between the police and a citizen. Non-
custodial questioning, or custodial interactions that do not constitute
interrogations, may still freely occur.
Finally, the six-month time period helps meet the goal in Edwards
of preserving a person's choice whether to speak to the police with or
without counsel. Six months is a significant enough interval that at
least it can be argued that some individuals might indeed feel differ-
ently about dealing with authority. If an accused in custody changes
his mind, it would be fairly easy for that person to initiate a discussion
that could lead to a valid Edwards waiver. When a person has been
released from custody, however, the opportunity for initiation is not
as readily forthcoming. There is a significant difference between
speaking to a jailer or an officer with whom you are in fairly constant
contact, and taking the initiative to go to the police station, seek out
an officer, and talk about an offense. In other words, if a defendant in
custody does not initiate conversation about an offense, it can be quite
properly assumed that she has not changed her mind about discussing
those events without the presence of counsel. Out of custody, that
same assumption cannot be indulged because of the greater effort and
difficulty involved in initiation.
This rule will not unduly thwart law enforcement objectives. The
police are free to pursue other incriminating evidence (subject, of
course to other constitutional or statutory limitations). Moreover; the
police may be able to rely on the suspect's own testimony as well.
Even during the six months when the authorities cannot obtain a
waiver from the defendant, the police are still not powerless to ques-
tion the defendant. First, the police could approach the suspect with
his attorney present. Second, because he is released from custody,
they could speak to him in a non-custodial atmosphere. That is, Ed-
wards presumably would not be violated if the police initiate non-cus-
todial interrogation.'54 Thus, for example, if a suspect invokes the
right to counsel, and is released from custody, the police could ap-
proach him at his house prior to the expiration of the six month period
and question him there without having to obtain a waiver. As such
questioning would constitute interrogation without custody, the Mi-
randa/Edwards protections would not govern this encounter.155
At the same time, a rule that ends Edwards protections after six
months and a release from custody is troubling. Perhaps most telling
is the argument that a six-month time period is arbitrary. While it
may be acceptable for the legislature to delineate such a time frame, it
may be wholly inappropriate for a court to "pick" such an interval
seemingly out of the air. As mentioned earlier, if six months is suffi-
cient for ending Edwards, why not five? A court should not be draw-
ing such lines without more significant support for the precise time
period chosen. The credibility of the court-which is its only
weapon-would be severely strained.
This argument has significant merit and is, indeed, troubling.
There are, nonetheless, several possible responses. First, of course,
would be to urge legislative change rather than judicial construction of
Edwards. It is more realistic, however, to assume that the issue will be
brought before the Court much sooner than it will face legislative
scrutiny. Second, the six-month time period can be justified, albeit
imperfectly. Any line drawn will be to some degree, arbitrary. None
of the arguments-i.e., that the passage of time minimizes the effects
154. Even non-custodial interrogation could be coercive. Thus, the traditional volunta-
riness test could still be used to ferret out coercion in these settings.
155. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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of badgering-can be precisely quantified. But if any error is made, it
is on the side of protecting the defendant's rights; if anything, six
months is likely over-protective of the right to counsel. Finally, the
Court has before drawn seemingly random time periods without sig-
nificant detriment. For example, in Riverside v. McLaughlin,'56 the
Court ruled that suspects arrested must be arraigned within forty-
eight hours of being taken into custody. To some extent, this forty-
eight hour rule is arbitrary; forty-nine hours would not pose a signifi-
cantly greater danger to the suspect's rights than forty-seven hours.
Yet some line needed to be drawn. Similarly, although six months
cannot be defended as against five months and twenty days, six
months seems a reasonable compromise in protecting the suspect's
rights as well as the interests of law enforcement.
IV. Conclusion
Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court has struggled with the
problems posed by police interrogations; Miranda and its progeny
have represented a Herculean effort on the part of the Court to limit
the excesses of police practices. In many ways, Edwards represents
the culmination of these efforts. By establishing a clear rule prohibit-
ing further interrogation upon assertion of the right to counsel, the
Court in Edwards provided assurances to suspects that their constitu-
tional rights would be honored by the government. Any attempt to
limit or re-define those rights should be undertaken with caution. Yet,
unless society and the courts are prepared to honor an assertion in
perpetuity, some breaking point consistent with the values and goals
of Miranda and Edwards must be discovered. This article attempted
to provide such a point. At a minimum, the enumeration of values
and goals, and the discussion of the most frequently suggested break-
ing points demonstrate that ending the Edwards presumption should
not be lightly undertaken. Reinterrogation is fraught with dangers for
a suspect's rights against self-incrimination; hopefully this article ad-
ded to the dialogue just now beginning concerning this critical subject.
156. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
